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Abstract
We develop a simple theoretical framework to examine on an integrated basis how the
form ofgovernment affects its power and size. The analytical framework abstracts from
distortions that arise from the means ofgovernment finance and separates government power into
two dimensions-pure coercive power and pure monopoly power. A government can exert its
coercive powerto shift the demand for its services outward and/or its monopoly powerto restrict
the output along a given demand curve to earn rents. Among the implications drawn from the
analysis are that government officials have an incentive to provide a non-optimal combination of
taxes and services, and that neither size nor rents alone are reliable indicators ofthe extent to
which government fails to achieve optimality in its provision ofservices.
Introduction
Economists have systematically examined the economics ofgovernment finance and long
ago established that the means offinancing government creates inefficiencies in the market. (For
instance, see Baumol and Bradford 1970 and Diamond and Mirrlees 1971.) What may be less
well examined and understood is that-apart from the distortions that arise from the means of
government finance--government officials can have an incentive to provide a combination of
services and taxes that are non-optimal. (See Niskanen 1997.) The ability ofgovernment to
exercise monopoly and coercive power creates these incentives.2
A growing number ofarticles explore the effect ofgovernment power on its size. For
example, Anderson and Tollison (1988) examine the implications ofmonopoly power for
government size. In his work onbureaucracy, Niskanen (1971) considers the implications of
coercive powerfor government size. Olson (1991), McGuire and Olson (1996), and Niskanen
(1997) examine the implications ofthejoint exercise ofmonopoly and coercive powerby an
autocratic government. To our knowledge, however, no previous work systematically examines
all the possible combinations ofmonopoly and coercive power.
Inthe present analysis, we develop a simple theoretical framework that allows usto
examine on an integrated basis the exercise of government power on its size. The framework
abstracts from any distortions in themeans ofgovernment finance and separates government
power into two dimensions-pure coercive power and pure monopoly power. Pure coercive
poweris the ability ofa government to compel consumers to accept more ofthe public good than
they desire at each tax price-eitherthrough legislative fiat orby price discrimination. Pure
monopoly poweris thegovernment's ability to restrict output along a given demand curve and
earn rents by doing so.
We consider four polar combinations ofcoercive and monopoly powerin comparison to
the social optimum: democracy, monopoly, bureaucracy, and autocracy. A purely democratic
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government exercises neither coercive nor monopoly power. A monopoly government is able to
restrict its output to earn rents in a traditional monopolistic fashion, but it cannot engage price
discrimination orexpropriation to coerce any remaining consumer surplus from its citizens. A
bureaucracy can exact all ofthe surplus that consumers obtain from the public goods it provides,
butit must use the surplus in the production ofpublic goods. It cannot restrict output to obtain3
rents as a monopoly would. An autocracy exercises both coercive and monopoly power.
The exercises allow us to demonstrate that a government can exert its coercive power to
shift demand for its services outward while it simultaneously exerts its monopoly powerto restrict
the output along that demand curve to earn rents. Thejoint exercise ofcoercive and monopoly
powerin autocracy can be said to result in both too much government (in the sense ofNiskanen,
1971) and too little government (in the sense ofAnderson and Tollison 1988 and Olson 1991).
We also find that size or rents alone may be poor indicators ofthe extent to which government
fails to achieve optimality in its provision ofservices. Government power may used to generate
rents, provide too much government service, or some combination ofboth.
Social Optimum
Consider ajurisdiction or economy withn identical individuals and two goods-a purely
public good and a purely private good.' For each individual, utility (U;) is a function ofthe
amount ofthe purely public good that is consumed jointly (G) and the amount ofthe purely
private good that is consumed bythe individual (XJ
U; = U/G, X,) for i = 1, 2, ..., n
The production opportunities available to the economy are described by an implicit
production function for the two goods,
F(G, X) = F
where X = Lx,.
(1)
(2)4
Assuming that utility is equal for all individuals, maximizing the utility for a representative
individual subject tothe productionfunction (2), aggregating over n individuals, and then
substituting the ratio ofmarginal costs for the marginal rate oftransformation yields a variant of





whereMCG is the marginal cost ofproviding the public good andMCxis the marginal cost of
providing the private good 2
Democracy
The Lindahl rule is a particularly appropriate model ofdemocracy when one is considering
a society ofn identical individuals and wants to abstract from the possibility ofthe redistributional
coalitions that can form under majority rule. Under the Lindahl rule, unanimous consent is used
to make public good decisions. That is, each taxpayer/voter must agree that the quantity ofthe
public goodbeing provided is the quantity that would maximize individual utility given thetax
price the individual faces for an additional unit ofthe public good.
For the representative individual, the conditions for theLindahl rule can be obtained by
maximizing utility subject to a budget constraint, which is a function ofendowment income and
the prices ofthe public and private goods. The budget constraint can be writtenY = tG + PX , I
5
jor i = 1, 2, ..., n (4)
where Y, is individual income endowment, t is thetax price that each individual faces perunit of
public good and P is the price ofthe private good.






in equation (1) subject to the budget constraint given in equation (4),
SimplifYing assumptions about production allow a sharper focus on the organizational
factors that shape govermnent size. Under the assumption that the private good is produced by a
competitive industry operating at constant costs, the price ofthe private goodwill equal the
marginal cost ofproducing it,
P -MC - x (6)
Similarly, under the assumptions that production ofthe public good is characterized by
constant costs, and the costs ofproviding the public good are distributed across then identical
individuals at the perunit tax rate t, the taxrevenue perunit ofoutput equals marginal cost,
nt = MCG
Aggregating the optimality condition given in equation (5) overn individuals and








As shown by the equations (8), the Lindahl rule satisfies the conditions for optimal provision of
the public good under the cost conditions given in equations (6) and (7).
The Lindahl optimality conditions are illustrated in theFigure. Inthe upper panel, the
representative individual faces the budget constraint labeled f l, and maximizes utility by selecting
the combination X* and G* along theindifference curve U3. Forn individuals taken together, the
demand curve shown in the lower panel shows the tax and output combinations that satisfy the
utility maximization condition. The quantity ofthe public good provided is G* and the perunit
tax revenue, nt*, equals the marginal cost ofproducing the public good, MCG.
Monopolization
Ifthe government faces no competition in providing the public good, it will not necessarily
produce the optimal amount ofthe public good at the optimal tax price as detennined bythe
Lindahl rule.
3 Instead, the government can obtain monopoly rents by restricting output ofthe
public good while raising its tax price (Anderson and Tollison 1988 and Olson 1991).
Government rents can be represented in this framework as the difference between the tax revenue
collected and the cost ofproducing the public good,
II = nt(G) - CG (9)7
where II is the government rent obtained from provision ofthe public good and CG is the total
cost ofits production.
Following Anderson and Tollison (1988), we consider a government that has monopoly
power butlike most private monopolies cannot price discriminate, eitherbecause it lacks the
information to do so orbecause a fiscal constitution (Brennan and Buchanan 1980) prevents it
from engaging in such discrimination.
4 In our model, the monopoly government maximizes the
rent from provision ofthe public good rent by restricting output ofthe public good to the point
where the marginal tax revenue obtained from provision ofthe public good equals marginal cost,
at nt+n-G = MCG aG
(10)
Because the tax price citizens are willing to pay falls with increased provision ofthe good, at/aG
is negative, and the aggregate tax price (nt) is greater than the marginal tax revenue.
Assuming government cannot compel its citizens to pay for more ofthe public good than
they would choose to purchase at any particular tax price, taxpaying voters must still agree that
the quantity ofthe public good being provided is the quantity that would maximize individual
utility at the tax price the individual faces for an additional unit ofthe public good. Therefore, the
utility-maximizing condition shown in equation (5) would still apply. Aggregating equation (5)









As shown by the equalities and inequality (11), a government that exercises monopoly power but
does not engage in any price discrimination (or coercion) will produce less ofthe public good than
is optimal.
The monopoly conditions are illustrated inthe Figure. For n individuals taken together,
the demand curve shown in the lower panel shows the tax and output combinations that satisfy
the utility maximization condition. For the quantity ofthe public good GlM, the marginal tax
revenue equals the marginal cost ofproducing the public good, MCG. The corresponding
monopoly price is ntm. At the tax price tm, the representative individual faces the budget
constraint labeled Y2 in the upper panel and maximizes utility by selecting the combination XLM and
GlM along the indifference curve U2. As shown, monopoly provision ofthe public good yields a
lower level ofutility for the representative taxpayer, which must be the case since the tax price is
higher than in the case without government monopoly power.
Bureaucracy
Conceiving ofa government with monopoly power but no coercive power is difficult. In
fact, popular writers and the economics literature often describe government monopolies in the
language ofcoercions Yet a simple monopoly model in the spirit ofAnderson and Tollison9
(1988), as presented above, ignores the exercise ofcoercive power. In contrast, the bureaucracy
model captures the coercive potential ofgovernment, but assumes the government uses the
coercive power to maximize output rather than to earn rents.
According to Niskanen (1971), a government bureaucracy will expand its output beyond
the optimal level to the point where consumers are indifferent between receiving and not receiving
the public good under a balanced budget constraint.6 Bureaucracies engage in this behavior
because the compensation (either monetary or psychic) is an increasing function ofsize. In
Niskanen's (1971) analysis, a bureaucracy cannot push its output beyond the point at which
consumer surplus is exhausted, however, because an exogenous entity from which the bureau
obtains its funds knows the maximum it is wining to pay for each level ofservice and wi1l not
permit the bureau to spend any more.
Alternatively, one might argue that taxpaying voters will abolish a government
bureaucracy that pushes output beyond the point at which consumer surplus is exhausted because
they would prefer no government at all to such an excessive provision ofthe public good'"
Because elimination ofgovernment strips existing government officials oftheir ability to choose
prices and quantities for the public good (and extract whatever rents are available by so doing),
bureaucrats adopt the strategy ofproducing up to the point where consumer surplus is exhausted
but no more'
Therefore, taken to an extreme, a bureaucracy has the ability to capture a sizable
consumer surplus, but it uses that surplus to produce more ofthe public good. The surplus may
be obtained either through direct expropriation or perfect price discrimination· Although the two
mechanisms operate very differently, both result in government acquisition ofall consumer surplus10
from provision ofthe public good and can be represented identically as government coercion.
A bureaucracy that exercises coercive powerbut no monopoly power can be represented
by the maximization ofthe public good, G, subject to a utility constraint, U, ~ U" and a balanced
budget constraint, ntG;, CO'







_au-,-/a_G _.!....) (fJ _ u*) = 0
au/ax, p , i
for each individual i (12)
aG nt ;, MCG , (nt-MCG)- = 0 at
Aggregating the Kuhn-Tucker conditions given in (12) over n individuals forms a
downward sloping boundary at G = ng(t). At points along this boundary, the representative
individual is exactly indifferent between no government and the public good and tax price
(13)
combinations implied by the boundary. In other words, points along the boundary exactly exhaust
the consumer surplus that the representative individual obtains from provision ofthe public good.
The boundary might be called "the Hicks-Niskanen demand" for the public good.
The Hicks-Niskanen demand curve represents the maximal combinations oftax price and
quantity ofthe public goodthat the representative individual will accept before demanding
abolishment ofthe government. As shown in (12), the representative individual has a lower
marginal rate ofsubstitution for the public good along the boundary than the tax price ofthe
public good relative to the price ofthe private good. This inequality means that the representative11
individual would be betteroffwith a smaller provision ofthe public good at each given tax price.
In this sense, the government bureaucracy can be seen as coercive.
The Kuhn-Tucker conditions given in (13) form a lower horizontal boundary at nt = MeG'
Therefore, a government that seeks to maximize production ofthe public good must be content to
just cover its costs.
The quantity ofthe public good, G, is maximized along the two boundaries Combining
the boundary conditions obtained from (12) and (13) togetherwith equation (6) yields
n,..,.a.".,u"-,/a"..,G~ < nt =
au/ax, P
(14)
As shown by the inequality and equality (14), the bureaucracy that exercises coercive
power to maximize output will produce more ofthe public goodthan is optimal.II Because
consumers are indifferent between the bureaucratic outcome and no public good at all and prefer
democracy to monopoly, and monopoly to no public good at all, the bureaucratic outcome is
necessarily worse than either the monopolistic orthe democratic outcomes.
The bureaucratic outcome is illustrated in the Figure under an assumption ofconstant
marginal utility for the private good.12 Inthe upper panel, the indifference curve U, shows the
combinations ofthe public and private goods that leave the representative individual no better off
than zero provision ofthe public good. Forn individuals taken together, the Hicks-Niskanen
demand curve shown in the lower panel traces out the tax price and public good combinations
that would leave the representative taxpayer onthe indifference curve U,. The maximum•
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provision ofthe public good is GCB with corresponding tax revenues ofnt* per unit ofpublic
good. The representative individual faces a per unit taxrate oft* which is consistent with the
budget constraint Y} shown in the upper panel. Every individual would prefer the (optimal)
combinationX* and G* along the indifference curve V3, but the taxpayer is forced to consume the
combinationXCB and GCB along the indifference curve V}. Every individual would even preferthe
monopoly combinationXIM and GIM along the indifference curve V2, which illustrates that
bureaucracy yields a lower level ofutility for the representative taxpayer than can achieved under
either democracy ormonopoly.
Autocracy
A government's use ofcoercive power simply to expand output ofthe public good beyond
the optimal level provides no clearbenefit to either taxpayers or government officials. Niskanen
(1971) resolved this problem to some extent himselfby assuming bureaucratic salaries are tied to
output, but it is far from clear (at least for the U.S. government) that bureaucrats in small
departments actually receive less monetary and non-monetary compensation than do bureaucrats
in large departments. Moreover, Niskanen's approach limits the rent-earning capabilities ofthe
government by implicitly assuming consumer surplus can be used only for production.
Olson (1991) discusses the coercive and monopoly aspects ofautocracy. Olson describes
autocrats as "stationary bandits" who take income from their citizens-anactionthat is a form of
coercion. He also argues that autocrats have an incentive to produce a monopoly quantity ofa
public good, which he expects to be less than optimal.
McGuire and Olson (1996) and Niskanen (1997) further develop Olson's concepts of•
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autocracy. Intheir models, the autocrat taxes private income and provides a public good,
maximizing the difference betweenthe tax revenue and cost ofproviding the good-without
taking any direct interest in citizen welfare. The extent to which a rational autocracy taxes its
citizens is limited bythe discouraging effects that income taxation has on process by which
income is generated.
Inmodel presented here, however, government finance is non-distortionary. The extentto
which government can tax its citizens is limited by the Hicks-Niskanen demand curve for the
public good, which represents the maximal combinations ofthe public good and thetax prices that
the government can obtain through coercion.n Inthis framework, autocracy is represented by the
maximization ofgovernment rent, II, subject to the utility constraint, U j $ U j • Solution ofthe
problem yields theKuhn-Tucker conditions for taxpayer utility (12) and the rent-maximizing
condition (10), as shown above.
Once again, aggregating the Kuhn-Tucker conditions given in (12) over n individuals
forms a downward sloping boundary at C = ng(t) thatis the Hicks-Niskanen demand for the
public good. This demand curve represents the maximal combinations oftax rates and provision
ofthe public goodthattherepresentative individual will accept before demanding abolishment of
the government. To maximize its rent, the autocratic government selects a tax and output
combination along the Hicks-Niskanen demand curve that satisfies equation (10). Combining the
boundary condition obtained from (12) with equations (10) and (6) yields
nt+n_ a _ 1C
n-:-a-:cu.:..,/a_c_ < nt > _--,:ac..;c'-.- = MCa
au/ax, P P MCx
(15)14
As shown by the inequalities and equality (15), an autocracy may produce more or less of
the public good than is optimal. Unless the public good is an inferior good, however, the
autocracy will produce less ofthe public good thanis optimal. 14 In either case, the combination of
coercive and monopoly power substantially reduces taxpayer welfare and yields rents to the
government that are much greater than could be earned through monopoly power alone. In
exercising its coercive power, an autocracy produces more ofthe public good than taxpayers
would desire at each tax price and, in doing so, substantially reduces welfare. In exercising its
monopoly power, an autocracy reduces output along the Hicks-Niskanen demand curve to obtain
greater rents than could be obtained through the exercise ofmonopoly power alone.
The autocratic outcomeis illustrated in the Figure. Again assuming constant marginal
utility for the private good, the maximal price and output combinations are achieved along the
Hicks-Niskanen demand curve shown in the lower panel-which holds the representative taxpayer
on the indifference curve V/ shown in the upper panel. The associated marginal revenue curve is
labeled "H-N l\1R" and is in this example superimposed onthe (normal) demand curve.
IS Forthe
quantity ofthe public good GCM' the marginal tax revenue equals the marginal cost ofproducing
the public good,MeG. The corresponding monopoly tax price is ntm. At the tax price tm, the
representative individual faces the budget constraint labeled Y2 in the upper panel and would
maximize utility by selecting the combinationX[M and G[M along the indifference curve V2, but is
forced to consume the combinationX cM and GCM along the indifference curve VI. Autocracy
yields the same level ofutility for the representative taxpayer as bureaucracy, which is less than
can be achieved under either democracy or monopoly. However, govermnent rents are twice15
those earned in a simple monopoly.
Some Implications for Government Power and Size
As shown above, government power has two dimensions: coercion and monopolization.
These dimensions are substantially different in nature from each other and have differing
implications for the provision ofpublic goods and the size ofgovernment. Coercive poweris the
ability to set government output higher than taxpayers would desire at each giventax price. This
coercive poweris achieved either through pure price discrimination orlegislative fiat. Monopoly
poweris the ability to restrict output in an economic environment otherwise characterized by
competition and earn rents by doing so.
As demonstrated for autocracy, the coercive and monopoly powers ofgovernment need
not be mutually exclusive. Government can exert its coercive power to shift the demand for its
services outward and simultaneously exert its monopoly powerto restrict output along a given
demand curve to earn rents. Therefore, the exercise ofcoercive and monopoly power can be said
to result in bothtoo much government (in the sense ofNiskanen 1971) and too little government
(in the sense ofAnderson and Tollison 1988 and Olson 1991).
With government having both coercive and monopoly dimensions to its power, neither
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government size nor rents alone are likely to prove reliable as indicators ofthe extent to which
government powerhas prevented the maximization oftaxpayerutility. The loss in utility
associated with moving from Lindahl democracy to an outcome that ranges somewhere from
bureaucracy to autocracy (along theHicks-Niskanen demand curve and U1) is consistent with a
range oftax and output combinations, including one that yields maximum rent and little change in16
output ofthe public good, as well as one that yields no rent and maximum output ofthe public
good. The exact combination ofrent and government services that is obtained depends upon both
how much power the government has and along which dimension the government is most able to
exercise its power.
Limiting Government Power
A number ofinstitutions have been developed in the world's countries to prevent
governments from exercising their coercive and monopoly powers. These institutions include
constitutional restraint (Brennan and Buchanan 1977 and Buchanan and Tullock 1962),
interjurisdictional competition (Tiebout 1956, Buchanan 1965, and McGuire 1972 and 1974), and
political competition.
Because interjurisdictional competition can be an effective means ofrestraining
government power, the centralization ofgovernment power away from the local level toward the
state, national, or international level may reduce consumer welfare (McGuire 1998). Arguments
for centralization typically involve the interjurisdictional externalities that can arise when there are
competing governments. In some cases, however, the gains from reducing these potential
interjurisdictional externalities through centralization may be more than offset by the welfare
losses that can result from the increased centralization ofgovernment power. In other words,
market fuilure can be replaced by an even more severe government failure.
Even in a constitutional democracy with interjurisdictional competition, professional
government managers have an economic incentive to develop and exercise autocratic power. One
way for citizens to limit autocratic government behavior is to monitor government behavior, but17
citizens must watch bothrents and size ifmonitoring is to be effective. Monitoring government
rents, but not size (output), could lead to an increase in government output without any
improvement in taxpayer welfare. On the other hand, monitoring government size (output), but
not rents, could lead to a substantial decline in consumer welfare at an apparently optimal level of
government service provision.
Monitoring ofthe government is itselfa public good and, as such, is likely to beunder
provided through voluntary exchange. (See Olson 1965.) The complexity ofmonitoring the
government, particularly in a world with multiple government goods that must be monitored in
two dimensions, suggests that monitoring itselfmay be carried outby a portion ofthe
government. That portion is typically elected officials who can compete for thejob ofmonitoring
government activity by offering to restrain government size and rents. 16
But the logic ofgovernment autocracy implies these elected officials will have their own
incentives to develop and exercise autocratic power. Citizens, the media, competing candidates,
otherjursidictions, and other branches and levels ofgovernment act to monitor elected officials
and/or provide competition. At the same time, bureaucrats, politicians, and special interest
groups act to reduce competition and weaken monitoring. (See Olson 1965 and 1982.) Tactics
to insulate government from competition can vary from simple to elaborate. Some U.S. states
have eneacted statutes that create significant obstacles to minor party candidates for public office.
The French government reduces the mobility ofits citizen by limiting their exposureto English,
while asserting the obstacle was enacted to benefit its citizenry by preserving French culture. The
exact degree to which theinterplay between competitive and anti-competitive forces acts to
restrain or promote government power is beyond the prelient analysis.18
Concluding Remarks
The combination ofcoercive and monopoly power provides government with the means
and incentive to set its taxes and services at non-optimal levels. (We demonstrate these results
without relying on distortionary taxes.) Size orrents alone may be poor indicators ofthe extent
to which government fails to achieve optimality. Government power can beused to generate
rents, provide too much ofthe public good, or some combination ofboth.
Government power can be thought ofin two dimensions: coercion and monopolization.
The exercise ofits coercive powerallows the government to shift the demand for its services
outward to the point where taxpayers are indifferent between no government and the combination
ofpublic good and taxes the government is offering. This outward shift ofdemand yields tax and
output combinations that are non-optimal. The exercise ofits monopoly power allows the
government to restrict its output along a given demand curve to earn rents. A governmentjointly
exercising both powers can produce too much government service for the implied tax prices and
that the same time restrict its outputto earn rents. Constitutional restraint, as well as
interjurisdictional and political competition may act to reduce government power in both
dimensions and increase taxpayer welfare.19
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L Because a pure public good does not suffer from congestion, the population ofthe
jurisdiction must be exogenously determined. (See McGuire 1972, 1974.) Both this assumption
and the one that the population is comprised ofn identical individuals simplifies the analysis but
leaves the conclusions unaltered.
2. The marginal rate oftransformation between G and Xis also defined asMCdMCx.
3. Short ofautocracy, there are several reasons why a government may have monopoly
power. Perhaps taxpayers cannot monitor government activities or fail to overcome the collective
action problems associated with doing so. Alternatively, taxpayers might be fully aware ofthe
government's activities but are unable to call government officials to account.
4. The combination ofmonopoly and coercive power is discussed in a later section.
5. For examples, see DiLorenzo (1999) and Olson (1991).
6. Brennan and Buchanan (1980) echo this theme when they argue Leviathan will
appropriate all surplus for its own use unless constraints are imposed upon it.
7. Foranalytical simplification, we assume voters can costlessly abolish the government but
cannot use the threat ofsuch abolition to foster more efficient behavior by bureaucrats. For a
more rigorous analysis ofthis issue and the types ofsituations in which these assumptions are
appropriate, see Romer and Rosenthal (1979).
8. Ourformulation ofthe bureaucratic model eliminates the need for an exogenous source of
funds and more firmly integrates the bureaucratic model into our analysis.
I 9. Consistent with a pure public good, the price discrimination is by unit ofoutput-not by
individual.
10. Niskanen modeled the government bureaucracy as maximizing revenue. To examine the
implications ofcoercive power in the absence ofrent-seeking, we assume the bureaucracy
maximizes output ofthe public good. Our assumption will yield somewhat different conclusions
than Niskanen reached.
II. In fact, a bureaucracy seeking to maximize output under a Lindahl rule will produce the
optimal quantity ofthe public good.•
22
12. Assuming constant marginal utility simplifies the graphical analysis, but does not alter the
conclusions.
13. InMcGuire and Olson (1996) and Niskanen (1997) analyses, coercion is represented by
the ability ofthe autocracy to set and enforce taxes without taking any direct interest in citizen
welfare.
14. Ifthe public good is a complementary input for private production, an autocrat could have
an incentive to produce more ofit than is optimal. See McGuire and Olson (1996).
15. Iftheprivate good were not characterized by constant marginal utility, the Hicks-
Niskanen marginal revenue curve would not be superimposed on the (normal) demand curve.















iRESEARCH PAPERS OF THE RESEARCH DEPARTMENT
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF DALLAS
Available, at no charge, from the Research Depamoent
Federal Reserve Bank ofDallas, P. O. Box 655906
Dallas, Texas 75265-5906
Please check the titles ofthe Research Papers you would like to receive:
9201 Are Deep Recessions Followed by Strong Recoveries? (Mark A. Wynne and Nathan S. Balke)
9202 The Case ofthe "Missing M2" (John V, Duca)
9203 Immigrant Links to the Home Country: Implications for Trade, Welfare and Factor Rewards (David M.
Gould)
9204 Does Aggregate Output Have a Unit Root? (Mark A. Wynne)
9205 Inflation and Its Variability: A Note (Kenneth M. Emery)
9206 Budget Constrained Frontier Measures ofFiscal Equality and Efficiency in Schooling (Shawna Grosskopf,
Kathy Hayes, Lori L. Taylor, William Weber)
9207 The Effects ofCredit Availability, Nonbank Competition, and Tax Reform on Bank Consumer Lending
(John V. Duca and Bonnie Garrett)
9208 On the Future Erosion ofthe North American Free Trade Agreement (William C. Gruben)
9209 Threshold Cointegration (Nathan S. Balke and Thomas B. Fomby)
9210 Cointegration and Tests ofa Classical Model ofInflation in Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Mexico, and Peru
(Raul Anibal Feliz and John H. Welch)
9211 Nominal Feedback Rules for Monetary Policy: Some Comments (Evan F. Koenig)
9212 The Analysis ofFiscal Policy in Neoclassical Models
l (Mark Wynne)
9213 Measuring the Value ofSchool Quality (Lori Taylor)
9214 Forecasting Turning Points: [s a Two-State Characterization ofthe Business Cycle Appropriate? (Kenneth
M. Emery & Evan F. Koenig)
9215 Energy Security: A Comparison ofProtectionist Policies (Mine K. Yilcel and Carol Dahl)
9216 An Analysis ofthe Impact ofTwo Fiscal Policies on the Behavior ofa Dynamic Asset Market (Gregory W.
Huffman)
9301 Human Capital Externalities, Trade, and Economic Growth (David Gould and Roy J. Ruffin)
9302 The New Face ofLatin America: Financial Flows, Markets, and Institutions in the 1990s (John Welch)
9303 A General Two Sector Model ofEndogenous Growth with Human and Physical Capital (Eric Bond, Ping
Wang, and Chong K. Yip)
9304 The Political Economy ofSchool Reform (S. Grosskopf, K. Hayes, L. Taylor, and W. Weber)
9305 Money, Output, and Income Velocity (Theodore Pabvos and Ping Wang)
9306 Constructing an Alternative Measure ofChanges in Reserve Requirement Ratios (Joseph H. Haslag and
Scott E. Hein)
9307 Money Demand and Relative Prices During Episodes ofHyperinflation (Ellis W. Tallman and Ping Wang)
9308 On Quantity Theory Restrictions and the Signalling Value ofthe Money Multiplier (Joseph Haslag)
9309 The Algebra ofPrice Stability (Nathan S. Balke and Kenneth M. Emery)
9310 Does It Matter How Monetary Policy is Implemented? (Joseph H. Haslag and Scott Hein)
9311 Real Effects ofMoney and Welfare Costs ofInflation in an Endogenously Growing Economy with
Transactions Costs (Ping Wang and Chong K. Yip)
93 I2 Borrowing Constraints, Household Debt, and Racial Discrimination in Loan Markets (John V. Duca and
Stuart Rosenthal)
9313 Default Risk, Dollarization, and Currency Substitution in Mexico (William Gruben and John Welch)
9314 Technological Unemployment (W, Michael Cox)
9315 Output, Inflation, and Stabilization in a Small Open Economy: Evidence from Mexico (John H. Rogers and
Ping Wang)
9316 Price Stabilization, Output Stabilization and Coordinated Monetary Policy Actions (Joseph H. Haslag)
9317 An Alternative Neo-Classical Growth Model with Closed-Form Decision Rules (Gregory W. Huffman)
9318 Why the Composite Index ofLeading Indicators Doesn't Lead (Evan F. Koenig and Kenneth M. Emery)
9319 Allocative Inefficiency and Local Government: Evidence Rejecting the Tiebout Hypothesis (Lori L.
Taylor)
9320 The Output Effects ofGovernment Consumption: A Note (Mark A. Wynne)
9321 Should Bond Funds be Included in M2? (John V. Duca)
9322 Recessions and Recoveries in Real Business Cycle Models: Do Real Business Cycle Models Generate









































Retaliation, Liberalization, and Trade Wars: The Political Economy ofNonstrategic Trade Policy (David
M. Gould and Graeme L. Woodbridge)
A General Two-Sector Model ofEndogenous Growth with Human and Physical Capital: Balanced Growth
and Transitional Dynamics (Eric W. Bond, Ping Wang,and Chong K. Yip)
Growth and Equity with Endogenous Human Capital: Taiwan's Economic Miracle Revisited (Maw-Lin
Lee, Ben-Chieh Liu, and Ping Wang)
Clearinghouse Banks and Banknote Over-issue (Scott Freeman)
Coal, Natural Gas and Oil Markets after World War 11: What's Old, What's New? (Mine K. YUcel and
Shengyi Guo)
On the Optimality ofInterest-Bearing Reserves in Economies ofOverlapping Generations (Scott Freeman
and Joseph Haslag)
Retaliation, Liberalization, and Trade Wars: The Political Economy ofNonstrategic Trade Policy (David
M. Gould and Graeme L. Woodbridge) (Reprint of9323 in error)
On the Existence ofNonoptimal Equilibria in Dynamic Stochastic Economies (Jeremy Greenwood and
Gregory W. Huffman)
The Credibility and Performance ofUnilateral Target Zones: A Comparison ofthe Mexican and Chilean
Cases (Raul A. Feliz and John H. Welch)
Endogenous Growth and International Trade (Roy 1. Ruffin)
Wealth Effects, Heterogeneity and Dynamic Fiscal Policy (Zsolt Becsi)
The Inefficiency ofSeigniorage from Required Reserves (Scott Freeman)
Problems ofTesting Fiscal Solvency in High Inflation Economies: Evidence from Argentina, Brazil, and
Mexico (John H. Welch)
Income Taxes as Reciprocal Tariffs (W. Michael Cox, David M. Gould, and Roy J. Ruffin)
Assessing the Economic Cost ofUnilateral Oil Conservation (Stephen P.A. Brown and Hillard G.
Huntington)
Exchange Rate Uncertainty and Economic Growth in Latin America (Darryl McLeod and John H. Welch)
Searching for a Stable M2-Demand Equation (Evan F. Koenig)
A Survey ofMeasurement Biases in Price Indexes (Mark A. Wynne and Fiona Sigalla)
Are Net Discount Rates Stationary?: Some Further Evidence (Joseph H. Haslag, Michael Nieswiadomy,
and D. J. Slottje)
On the Fluctuations Induced by Majority Voting (Gregory W. Huffman)
Adding Bond Funds to M2 in the P-Star Model ofInflation (Zsolt Becsi and John Duca)
Capacity Utilization and the Evolution ofManufacturing Output: A Closer Look at the "Bounce-Back
Effect" (Evan F. Koenig)
The Disappearing January Blip and Other State Employment Mysteries (Frank Berger and Keith R.
Phillips)
Energy Policy: Does it Achieve its Intended Goals? (Mine YUcel and Shengyi Guo)
Protecting Social Interest in Free Invention (Stephen P.A. Brown and William C. Gruben)
The Dynamics ofRecoveries (Nathan S. Balke and Mark A. Wynne)
Fiscal Policy in More General Equilibriium (Jim Dolmas and Mark Wynne)
On the Political Economy ofSchool Deregulation (Shawna Grosskopf, Kathy Hayes, Lori Taylor, and
William Weber)
The Role ofIntellectual Property Rights in Economic Growth (David M. Gould and William C. Gruben)
U.S. Banks, Competition, and the Mexican Banking System: How Much Will NAFTA Matter? (William
C. Gruben, John H. Welch and Jeffery W. Gunther)
Monetary Base Rules: The Currency Caveat (R. W. Hafer, Joseph H. Haslag, and Scott E. Hein)
The Information Content ofthe Paper-Bill Spread (Kenneth M. Emery)
The Role ofTax Policy in the Boom/Bust Cycle ofthe Texas Construction Sector (D'Ann Petersen, Keith
Phillips and Mine YUcel)
The p* Model ofInflation, Revisited (Evan F. Koenig)
The Effects ofMonetary Policy in a Model with Reserve Requirements (Joseph H. Haslag)
An Equilibrium Analysis ofCentral Bank Independence and Inflation (Gregory W. Huffman)
Inflation and Intermediation in a Model with Endogenous Growth (Joseph H. Haslag)
Country-Bashing Tariffs: Do Bilateral Trade Deficits Matter? (W. Michael Cox and Roy 1. Ruffin)
Building a Regional Forecasting Model Utilizing Long-Term Relationships and Short-Term Indicators
(Keith R. Phillips and Chih-Ping Chang)
Building Trade Barriers and Knocking Them Down: The Political Economy ofUnilateral Trade
Liberalizations (David M. Gould and Graeme L. Woodbridge)
On Competition and School Efficiency (Shawna Grosskopf, Kathy Hayes, Lori L. Taylor and William L.
Weber)9507 Alternative Methods ofCorporate Control in Commercial Banks (Stephen Prowse)
9508 The Role ofIntratemporal Adjustment Costs in a Multi-Sector Economy (Gregory W. Huffman
and Mark A. Wynne)
9509 Are Deep Recessions Followed By Strong Recoveries? Results for the G-7 Countries (Nathan
S. Balke and Mark A. Wynne)
9510 Oil Prices and Inflation (Stephen P.A. Brown, David B. Oppedahl and Mine K. Yiicel)
9511 A Comparison ofAlternative Monetary Environments (Joseph H. Haslag))
9512 Regulatory Changes and Housing Coefficients (John V. Duca)
9513 The Interest Sensitivity ofGDP and Accurate Reg Q Measures (John V. Duca)
9514 Credit Availability, Bank Consumer Lending, and Consumer Durables (John V. Duca and
Bonnie Garrett)
9515 Monetary Policy, Banking, and Growth (Joseph H. Haslag)
9516 The Stock Market and Monetary Policy: The Role ofMacroeconomic States (Chih-Ping Chang
and Huan Zhang)
9517 Hyperinflations and Moral Hazard in the Appropriation ofSeigniorage: An Empirical Implementation
With A Calibration Approach (Carlos E. Zarazaga)
9518 Targeting Nominal Income: A Closer Look (Evan F. Koenig)
9519 Credit and Economic Activity: Shocks or Propagation Mechanism? (Nathan S. Balke and
Chih-Ping Chang)
9601 The Monetary Policy Effects on Seignorage Revenue in a Simple Growth Model (Joseph H. Haslag)
9602 Regional Productivity and Efficiency in the U.S.: Effects ofBusiness Cycles and Public Capital
(Dale Boisso, Shawna Grosskopfand Kathy Hayes)
9603 Inflation, Unemployment, and Duration (John V. Duca)
9604 The Response ofLocal Governments to Reagan-Bush Fiscal Federalism (D. Boisso, Shawna
Grosskopfand Kathy Hayes)
9605 Endogenous Tax Determination and the Distribution ofWealth (Gregory W. Huffman)
9606 An Exploration into the Effects ofDynamic Economic Stabilization (Jim Dolmas and Gregory W.
Huffman)
9607 Is Airline Price Dispersion the Result ofCareful Planning or Competitive Forces? (Kathy J.
Hayes and Leola B. Ross)
9608 Some Implications ofIncreased Cooperation in World Oil Conservation (Stephen P.A. Brown
and Hillard G. Huntington)
9609 An Equilibrium Analysis ofRelative Price Changes and Aggregate Inflation (Nathan S. Balke
and Mark A. Wynne)
9610 What's Good for GM...? Using Auto Industry Stock Returns to Forecast Business Cycles and Test the Q-
Theory ofInvestrnent (Gregory R. Duffee and Stephen Prowse)
961 I Does the Choice ofNominal Anchor Matter? (David M. Gould)
9612 The Policy Sensitivity ofIndustries and Regions (Lori L. Taylor and Mine K. Yiicel)
9613 Oil Prices and Aggregate Economic Activity: A Study ofEight OECD Countries (Stephen P.A. Brown,
David B. Oppedahl and Mine K. YOcel)
9614 The Effect ofthe Minimum Wage on Hours ofWork (Madeline Zavodny)
9615 Aggregate Price Adjustment: The Fischerian Alternative (Evan F. Koenig)
9701 Nonlinear Dynamics and Covered Interest Rate Parity (Nathan S. Balke and Mark E. Wohar)
9702 More on Optimal Denominations for Coins and Currency (Mark A. Wynne)
9703 Specialization and the Effects ofTransactions Costs on Equilibrium Exchange (James Dolmas
and Joseph H. Haslag)
9704 The Political Economy ofEndogenous Taxation and Redistribution (Jim Dolmas and Gregory W.
Huffman)
9705 Inequality, Inflation, and Central Bank Independence (Jim Dolmas, Gregory W. Huffman, and
Mark A. Wynne)
9706 On The Political Economy ofImmigration (Jim Dolmas and Gregory W. Huffman)
9707 Business Cycles Under Monetary Union: EU and US Business Cycles Compared ( Mark A. Wynne and
Jahyeong Koo)
9708 Allocative Inefficiency and School Competition (Shawna Grosskopf, Kathy Hayes, Lori L. Taylor and
William L. Weber)
9709 Goods-Market Competition and Profit Sharing: A Mullisector Macro Approach (John V. Duca and David
D. VanHoose)
9710 Real-Time GOP Growth Forecasts (Evan F. Koenig and Sheila Dolmas)
9711 Quasi-Specific Factors: Worker Comparative Advantage in the Two-Sector Production Model (Roy J.
Ruffin)9712 Decomposition ofFeedback Between Time Series in a Bivariate Error-Correction Model (Jahyeong Koo
and Paul A. Johnson)
9713 Measuring Regional Cost ofLiving (Jahyeong Koo, Keith Phillips and Fiona Sigalla)
9801 Revenue-Maximizing Monetary Policy (Joseph H. Haslag and Eric R. Young)
9802 How WeI! Does the Beige Book Reflect Economic Activity? Evaluating Qualitative Information
Quantitatively (Nathan S. Balke and D'Ann Petersen)
9803 What Should Economists Measure? The Implications ofMass Production vs. Mass Customization
(W Michael Cox and Roy J. Ruffin)
9804 On the Political Economy ofImmigration and Income Redistribution (Jim Dolmas and Gregory W.
Huffman)
9805 The Rise ofGoods-Market Competition and the Fal! ofNominal Wage Contracting: Endogenous Wage
Contracting in a Multisector Economy (John V. Duca and David D. VanHoose)
9901 Seigniorage in a Neoclassical Economy: Some Computational Results (Joydeep Bhattacharya and Joseph
H. Haslag)
9902 Financial Repression, Financial Development and Economic Growth (Joseph H. Haslag and Jahyeong
Koo)
9903 Core Inflation: A Review ofSome Conceptual Issues (Mark A. Wynne)
9904 Privatization, Competition, and Supercompetition in the Mexican Commercial Banking System (William
C. Gruben and Robert P. McComb)
9905 When Does Financial Liberalization Make Banks Risky?: An Empirical Examination ofArgentina, Canada
and Mexico (William C. Gruben, Jahyeong Koo and Robert R. Moore)
9906 Has Monetary Policy Become Less Effective? (Joseph H. Haslag)
9907 Bank Structure, Capital Accumulation and Growth: A Simple Macroeconomic Model (Mark G. Guzman)
9908 Autocracy, Democracy, Bureaucracy, or Monopoly: Can You Judge a Government hy Its Size? (Stephen
P.A. Brown and Jason L. Saving
Name: Organization:
Address: City, State and Zip Code:
Please add me to your mailing list to receive future Research Papers: Ves NoResearch Papers Presented at the
1994 Texas Conference on Monetary Economics
April 23-24, 1994
held at the Federal Reserve Bank ofDallas, Dallas, Texas
Available, at no charge, from the Research Department
Federal Reserve Bank ofDallas, P. O. Box 655906
Dallas, Texas 75265-5906
Please check the titles ofthe Research Papers you would like to receive:
A Sticky-Price Manifesto (Laurence Ball and N. Gregory Mankiw)
2 Sequential Markets and the Suboptimality ofthe Friedman Rule (Stephen D. Williamson)
3 Sources ofReal Exchange Rate Fluctuations: How Important Are Nominal Shocks? (Richard Clarida and
Jordi Gali)
4 On Leading Indicators: GeDing It Straight (Mark A. Thoma and Jo Anna Gray)
5 The Effects ofMonetary Policy Shocks: Evidence From the Flow ofFunds (Lawrence 1. Christiano,
Martin Eichenbaum and Charles Evans)
Name: Organization:
Address: City, State and Zip Code:
Please add me to your mailing list to receive future Research
Papers: Yes No